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14

Another possible implication of such a development is that from

a political perspective, it becomes more difficult to regulate the

incentive structure within the sickness system, as only one part of the

system can be controlled politically. Likewise, the administrative cost

for running several parallel systems is also higher than in the case of

one system.

At the individual level, individuals may have an increasingly hard

time obtaining an overview of the system and understanding their

own income protection. Earlier investigations showed that 25–30 per

cent of insured individuals

3

do not receive the benefit they are entitled

to from occupational insurance during periods of sickness. The reason

for this is that they are not aware of the fact that they are entitled to

occupational sickness insurance and thus they do not apply for

benefits (Sjögren Lindquist and Wadensjö, 2007).

Likewise it is important to note that not everyone is covered by

occupational insurance, as this is the case only for individuals

employed at a work place covered by a collective agreement.

Consequently, occupational insurance only covers people who

currently are employed or who recently were employed. Accordingly,

there is a group of individuals who lacks the supplementary

protection offered by the collective insurance. This may be

problematic if the coverage offered by the public system continues to

decrease.

Further information in English

An academic paper in English on the same material is forthcoming.

Please contact the author for more information.

3

Within the group privately employed blue-collar workers and staff employed by the

municipality or county councils.