12(38)
It should also be mentioned that the reforms target parents at different
levels of use, the first reserved month encouraging fathers to take any
leave, the second reserved month encouraging fathers to take more than
one month, and the bonus encouraging fathers to take more than two
months. The target group has thus changed over time in line with the
development of usage of leave, but also in line with the development of the
social norm of fatherhood. With reference to Bourdieu’s (1996) idea of
family policy as constructing family by strengthening one type of family,
the reforms construct the idea of how an ideal family shares the leave over
time, going from father involvement towards gender-equal sharing of
parenthood (Klinth and Johansson 2010). In addition, the bonus increases
horizontal equity
(McDonald 2006b:219) between parents and other men
and women, especially when we compare mothers with women without
children, as it encourages mothers to go back to work earlier without
challenging the Swedish norm of childcare in the home for the first year.
Mothers’ earlier return to work is also beneficial to their
lifetime earnings.
The relative difference between mothers and fathers is likely to decrease as
well, as the fathers’ earnings will be reduced during their leave. The first
reserved month and the bonus are more efficient in this respect than the
second month as the second reserved month was added on and did not
challenge mothers’ time at home.
Lately, family policy in Sweden has been generally motivated by the
importance of children
. Father involvement is generally seen as positive in
terms of
child development
. A number of studies lend support to the
association between early father involvement and later father engagement
(Haas and Hwang 2008, Duvander and Jans 2009) but the causality and
selection aspects have not been disentangled. Nevertheless the idea of
children’s right to their fathers is strengthened by all three reforms.
Children also have a long-term economic value to society and becoming a
parent can be seen as a right that should not be penalized. Reserving one
month for each parent meant that fathers’ capability to claim this month
increased, in negotiations with both the mother and the workplace (Hobson
and Fahlén 2009). To some extent claims were extended by the second
“daddy” month. The gender equality bonus does not indicate increased
ability to claim in the same way, as time with the child is not forfeited if the
bonus is not used; an extra bonus is added that was not previously part of
families’ economic calculations.
Workplace possibilities
to use the parental
leave benefits are provided equally by legislation in Sweden, but the
capability to claim rights at the workplace is, as mentioned, likely to be
stronger for the reserved months than the bonus. Nevertheless, the bonus
is likely to be claimed by highly educated fathers who already use longer
leave. They often work in positions with more autonomy where they have
more room for negotiating working conditions than less educated fathers in
less flexible positions. The bonus may thus strengthen a group of fathers
rather than all fathers.
In conclusion, although the three reforms are all gender-neutral, the bonus
is a particular privilege for working parents. The incentives are based on
time or economic benefits but were introduced in different contexts and
have targeted different groups of users. The leave has increased in
complexity over time, especially with the bonus. The long-term effects of
temporary exits from the labor market or alternative childcare cost are not
considered in this study but need to be kept in mind.
